Integration of insurgents in post-conflict Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone presents a unique reintegration challenge. The West African state must reconcile ex-combatants with victims and civil society and also incorporate a brutalised group of highly disaffected youths. In such contexts, recovery requires more than encouragement of political participation and holding elections.

A report from Kings College London, in the UK, examines the challenges of reintegrating the combatants of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) who waged a ten-year insurgency against the Sierra Leonean government.

The RUF differed from many non-state armed groups, lacking popular support or a coherent political strategy. Rather than seek to establish a political constituency, the RUF’s relation to the people was characterised by brutal atrocities. With much of its rank-and-file membership comprised of forcibly recruited child soldiers the RUF represented a largely illiterate and socially dislocated body of violent youths. The RUF mostly sustained itself through exchanging diamonds for weapons and ammunition.

Cessation of hostilities in 2002 was due to intervention by British and Guinean troops and deployment of a massive UN peacekeeping force. A UN-led disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme has been relatively successful. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and Special Court were established, in 2005 the UN withdrew peacekeepers and in 2007 Sierra Leone held elections.

Despite these successes Sierra Leone remains abjectly poor. Former RUF fighters make up a significant portion of those struggling to find work. Many are deeply cynical and pessimistic, factors which helped trigger the original conflict.

Following models employed elsewhere, the international community provided funds to enable the RUF to rebrand as a political party. However, it won less than two per cent of the vote in 2002 elections and was disbanded in 2007. The attempt to transform the RUF into a political party misunderstood the motives of its young membership.

• Many ex-fighters felt themselves to be victims and had no desire to support the RUF.
• They regard all politicians as corrupt, with no interest in supporting young men’s needs for jobs and education.
• They resent the re-emergence of traditional elites, especially the reimposition – under donor pressure – of traditional chiefs.
• Ex-RUF combatants are so stigmatised that many have avoided signing up to official DDR programmes in order to keep a low profile.

In its final report the TRC demanded action to tackle the “lethal cocktail of youth marginalisation and political manipulation.” In response the government promised young people a stake in society denied by pre-conflict administrations. However, there are few tangible results and government programmes have lost funding. Youth integration projects run by civil society and the UN cannot fill the gap in this crucial aspect of recovery.

Experience in Sierra Leone is relevant for other post-conflict states:

• Reintegration should not be judged solely by the absence of violence.
• Power must not be offered to a non-state armed actor without prior analysis of the motivations of both its leadership and rank-and-file combatants.
• Dismantling, rather than the political formalisation of a non-state armed actor, may best promote peace.
• If not provided with work or official avenues to voice their concerns, ex-fighters can easily be recruited to participate in acts of political intimidation and crime.