• Display

an Eldis Resource

This paper examines the effective implementation of three international anti-corruption instruments – the UN Convention Against Corruption (2003); the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (1997); and the Council of Europe Civil Law Convention Against Corruption (1999). The paper argues that adoption of these measures has been relatively ineffective because these conventions, while ratified by national parliaments, are not being implemented in the government agencies most prone to corruption – particularly the traffic police, security services, customs, and tax inspection.The paper covers several issues, including:

• the basic points that should (or should not) be included in executive regulations governing law enforcement agencies
• methods of discouraging civil servants from taking bribes
• ways in which countries can finance additional law enforcement obligations imposed by the international conventions against corruption

Basic issues that should be dealt with regarding executive regulations that tackle corruption, include:

• the distinction between bribes and gifts -in developing countries bribes are often confused with gifts, and this has led most international conventions against corruption, including the UN Convention against Corruption, to prohibit (or at least regulate) gift-giving to civil servants
• the problem of unnecessary regulation - often the state engages in unnecessary anti-corruption programmes or provides problematic regulations that may even enhance corruption
• the need for clear regulatory drafting to help compensate for the vagueness of the conventions themselves - lawyers and other specialists working in agencies such as customs or the police should write detailed department-level instructions to help implement these international conventions

Measures to discourage civil servants from taking bribes, include:

• increasing the liability of a civil servant’s superiors
• charging suspects with non-criminal corruption offences so as to employ a burden of proof lower than that required in criminal cases
• implementing “integrity probes”

The paper suggests that the increased burden (in terms of the cost of enforcement) imposed by the international anticorruption conventions on executive agencies – particularly law enforcement agencies – could be paid for from recovered proceeds of corruption, qui tam rewards, civil damages imposed on corrupt parties, and fines imposed on negligent companies or organisations. It recommends that:

• officials working in executive agencies (such as customs, police, or tax) need to draft regulations implementing the international anti-corruption standards
• each article of these regulations should address a separate issue contained in the national anti-corruption law (which enacts the three international conventions referred to)

• Full text of document
• Publisher details
• Send to a friend