The IMF and good governance

• the IMF was created to solve short-term, external imbalances in national economies but has moved far beyond its original mandate
• the IMF makes decisions with major implications for poor countries yet lacks the expertise to provide far-reaching policy prescriptions. Its structure also inadequately represents the poorest countries, which are its main clients
• while judging good governance (telling governments to make documents more accessible) and to open up their decisionmaking processes, the IMF remains unaccountable and undemocratic

The article is critical over U.S. foreign policy is criticised for:

• the U.S. has used the IMF, including the fund’s policy on good governance, as a way of furthering narrowly conceived U.S. foreign policy interests
• the politicization of IMF lending decisions is created by its flawed voting structure, which is based on each member’s contribution to the fund
• good governance at the IMF is also thwarted by the fund’s flawed practices of audit and evaluation

The article recommends that:

• the IMF should return to its original mandate of monitoring economies and lending for short-term stabilization; loan conditionality should be curtailed
• the U.S. must play a leadership role in reforming the IMF, such as making the fund’s executive board more transparent and enhancing accountability through an independent evaluation unit
• he U.S. must give up its veto power at the IMF and work to increase the voting power and representation of poorer countries