Document Abstract
Published:
2008
What is quality of government? a theory of impartial government institutions
Impartiality of institutions as a measure of governance quality
Based on analyses of political theory, this paper proposes a coherent and specific definition of quality of governance, focussing on the impartiality of institutions that exercise government authority. It relates the idea of impartiality to a series of criticisms stemming from the fields of public administration, public choice, multiculturalism, and feminism. To place the theory of impartiality in a larger context, it contrasts its scope and meaning with that of a three-fold set of competing concepts of quality of government: democracy, the rule of law, and efficiency/effectiveness.
The authors identify at least three problems with existing definitions of quality of governance: they are extremely broad; they suffer from a functionalist slant; or they deal only with corruption. Especially the first two problems seriously weaken the usefulness of existing conceptions. The paper then discusses how the idea of impartiality differs from the absence of corruption and argues that—other than in exceptional circumstances—impartiality is a procedural norm that does not affect the contents of specific policies. Instead, it is impartiality in the exercise of power (the “ought to treat equally” principle) that is the central component of quality of governance.
Impartiality could hardly be considered the sole normative yardstick by which all aspects of a political system may be assessed. The authors, therefore relate the theory of impartiality to a tripartite set of competing conceptions of what constitutes quality of governance, by arguing that
The authors identify at least three problems with existing definitions of quality of governance: they are extremely broad; they suffer from a functionalist slant; or they deal only with corruption. Especially the first two problems seriously weaken the usefulness of existing conceptions. The paper then discusses how the idea of impartiality differs from the absence of corruption and argues that—other than in exceptional circumstances—impartiality is a procedural norm that does not affect the contents of specific policies. Instead, it is impartiality in the exercise of power (the “ought to treat equally” principle) that is the central component of quality of governance.
Impartiality could hardly be considered the sole normative yardstick by which all aspects of a political system may be assessed. The authors, therefore relate the theory of impartiality to a tripartite set of competing conceptions of what constitutes quality of governance, by arguing that
- although democracy is probably a necessary condition for quality of governance, it is hardly sufficient.
- the impartiality principle implies and encompasses the rule of law, while the opposite is not true.
- efficiency/ effectiveness lacks an independent normative justification and is therefore always secondary to impartiality. Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that impartiality should enhance effectiveness/efficiency.
