Challenges to India’s ‘rise to power’
India’s soaring growth rate has turned it into the fourth largest economy in the world. It is one of the G20 group – the international forum of finance ministers and central bank governors working to promote international financial stability – and a leading member of the World Trade Organization.
In 2006, India was welcomed into the exclusive club of legitimate nuclear weapons states through the offer of a USA-India nuclear deal. The USA and the European Union are careful to placate India on issues of global importance. But research from the University of Cambridge, in the UK, urges caution in seeing India as a global power.
The author suggests five key reasons for India’s rise to power: democracy in the context of the global terrorism threat; the regional balance of power and India’s potential as an ally of the USA against China; its responsible nuclear power status; its attractive markets for foreign investment and exports; and gradual learning within international institutions.
Examining the history of India’s rise to power, the author finds the phenomenon is not a new one. Declarations about India’s rise may be exaggerated, and a seat at the negotiating tables of international institutions does not ensure a positive influence.
- India’s economic growth builds upon a cautious and gradual liberalisation programme which began in the 1980s.
- India’s negotiation strategies build upon half a century of international activism as the ‘voice of the voiceless’.
- Domestically, India is faced with a huge, illiterate, poor population, as well as extreme corruption and the devastation of HIV and AIDS.
- Infrastructure, water and electricity supply, and farmers’ issues remain major problems, which discourages foreign investment and global status.
- Economic growth is not reflected in the life of the middle classes; the much-praised technology sector employs only 1.3 million people in a working population of 400 million.
- Despite India’s veto power in other international arenas, it has not yet secured a permanent seat with veto power on the United Nations Security Council.
Converting India’s influence into the ability to achieve preferred outcomes will require considerable negotiating skills. India is faced with two strategic options. A distributive negotiation strategy involves taking hard-line positions, and refusing to make any concessions. An integrative strategy involves sharing information and proposing concessions. The first, if pushed too far, can involve public humiliation (if the country ends up having to make concessions in spite of the claims made earlier); the second risks appearing weak.
The author suggests that:
- India should first use a distributive strategy, then an integrative strategy.
- This requires a show of strength and commitment in the first stage of negotiations, followed by a willingness to make trade-offs and concessions in the second.
- This would involve engaging with countries once considered opponents, while honouring developing country alliances or building new coalitions with developing countries.
