Collecting data
Survey techniques to measure and explain corruption
Tracking corruption through survey techniques
Authors:
R. Reinikka; J. Svensson
Publisher:
World Bank, 2003
This paper discusses survey techniques aimed at a better measurement of corruption at the micro level and argues that with appropriate survey methods and interview techniques, it is possible to collect quantitative micro-level data on corruption.
In particular, it highlights public expenditure tracking surveys (PETS), quantitative service delivery surveys (QSDS), and enterprise surveys, with several applications. These surveys permit measurement of corruption at the level of individual agents, such as schools, health clinics, or firms. They also permit the study of mechanisms responsible for corruption, including leakage of funds and bribery.
Until recently, the analysis of service delivery has focused almost entirely on financing services, while provision -particularly issues related to institutions, incentives, and provider behaviour -has received much less attention. The PETS and QSDS address this omission.
The paper first discusses the key features and findings of the expenditure tracking surveys in education and health care where the focus is on leakage of public funds. It then looks at the experience with provider surveys to explore incentives and performance problems, such as absenteeism, on the frontline. The next section presents the firm-level approach and discusses key findings on the incidence, level, and effects of corruption on enterprise performance. It concludes with a discussion on policy implications.
From a policy perspective, the paper says, the extent (or variation across firms and service providers) of corruption and capture seem to have less to do with conventional audit and supervision mechanisms, and more to do with the schools’ or clinics’ opportunity to voice their claims for the funds, and firms’ bargaining positions. Traditionally, it has been left to the government and a country’s legal institutions to devise and enforce public accountability. The findings reviewed in this paper question this one-sided approach.
