Certifying election commissions to stop election violence

Question: what do Kenya, Georgia, Ukraine and Haiti have in common? Answer: located on three different continents, each country has held highly problematic elections over the past five years – with highly problematic election commissions organising them.

In each country, elections led to serious demonstrations that threatened public order. Of course, we know that the disputed elections themselves did not produce the ethnic grievances that tear at Kenya, or the east-west divide that polarises Ukraine, or the rich-poor class cleavage in Haiti. We also know that addressing these 'root causes' of conflict – Haiti's desperate poverty, for example, or disputes over land rights in Kenya – is a daunting, long-term endeavour.

Indeed, precisely because the particular conditions in weak states make them vulnerable to mass disturbance, it is crucial to treat elections with utmost sensitivity. The challenge is whether it is possible to reduce the chances of election-related violence by improving electoral administration.

The challenge is whether it is possible reduce the chances for election-related violence by improving electoral administration

The answer is a resounding 'yes' – provided the common link in bad elections is understood. In each of the 'election-challenged' countries cited above, the election management body (EMB) was deficient:

• In Haiti, chaos within the election commission led to an unintentionally inaccurate result that immediately raised suspicions of rigging.
• In Georgia, Kenya and Ukraine, election commissions were dominated by ruling parties, who exploited their positions, systematically distorting results to deny the opposition victory; unrest followed.

In short, there is a direct, causal link between dysfunctional or biased election commissions and contested elections. Rather than rely solely on traditional tools of election observation and technical assistance, an innovative scheme – certification of election management bodies, performed by a special United Nations (UN) election body – should be introduced:

• Instead of waiting for problems to emerge and then reporting on them passively, external experts would begin their review well in advance of the election.
• Using criteria developed jointly with election experts from developing countries and transitional democracies, the UN certification team would check to see whether core minimum standards of operation are being met.
• The most crucial standards would focus on the composition of the election commission – ensuring independent voices are included.
• Rules, including the all-important issue of vote tabulation and integrity of the ballot, would also be scrutinised.
• The certification team would not just evaluate, but also judge and issue a verdict as to whether or not the EMB meets minimum standards.

Countries that reject either the UN experts' conclusion, or refuse to subject their commission to certification, would be sending a public, early warning of trouble ahead. With such a mechanism, diplomats, technical advisors and opposition figures would have ample time – and an ample platform – to press for more transparency and reform.
Certification does raise many questions about the standards to be applied and perceived infringements on sovereignty which is a sensitive issue in many parts of the world. However, with good will and determination, these issues could find satisfactory resolution. Those who believe certification cannot work have an obligation to offer their own solutions if we are to avoid future Kenya-style crises.

Edward P Joseph
The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, Nitze Building, 1740 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington, DC 20036, USA
edward.joseph@yahoo.com