Democratisation and reform in South-East Asia

The diversity of political systems in South-East Asia and the subsequent relationship between political power and the security sector make security sector reform (SSR) – and its implications for democratic transformation – problematic.

The 2007 Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Charter mandated democracy as one of the principal political developments in the region. The subsequent interest democratisation has generated in SSR has important policy implications. This emerging democratic impulse in the region, however, has taken very diverse paths.

• Reducing the military’s involvement in political mechanisms of formal national power has been central to both democratisation and peacebuilding in Indonesia and Thailand. In the Philippines, it is a key part of sustaining the legitimacy of its democratic institutions. 
• In the Philippines and Thailand, frustration over scandal-torn governments has led to extra-constitutional means of replacing or attempting to replace incumbent authority figures, usually with the explicit involvement of the country’s security forces. 
• In the Philippines, opinion polls show that citizens see no contradiction between these extra-constitutional means and democracy. Furthermore, poor management of peace by civilian authorities has made the military restive.

In a region where a commitment to democracy and human rights has become a regional aspiration, democratisation will be a key element of security sector governance

Democratisation and peacebuilding require active participation from citizens. Civil society groups have been pivotal in reducing conflict in local areas in Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia, and helped strengthen democratic institutions. At the same time, however, the support militant and other groups give to segments of the military to overthrow the government presents the dark side of civil society participation. Accordingly, in addition to military reform, SSR also requires reform of the civilian institutions with oversight functions over the military.

• In Indonesia, the lack of experience with democratic governance provides a rich ground for socialisation in democratic culture. This same lack of experience, however, opens the process of democratisation (and socialisation) up to the possibility of subversion by particular political interests. 
• This is also relevant to Thailand, where money politics has made it very difficult for democratic institutions to take root, creating openings for military intervention in politics. 
• While SSR is largely being undertaken in democratic and democratising countries, it has little resonance in the one dominant-party systems of Malaysia and Singapore. In these countries, security sector governance remains strong, with civilian institutions being able to maintain their oversight functions over the military.
• In non-democratic regimes, civilian control over the military has also largely been maintained. In Laos and Viet Nam, the Communist Party controls the army. Such regimes emphasise national security. Their policies subordinate human security concerns (believed to be best addressed in a democracy) to national security imperatives.
• The situation is similar in ‘democratising’ Cambodia and with the absolute monarchy of Brunei, where, while the military is technically accountable to civilian authorities, accountability is more personal than institutional. Thus, human security imperatives are again given less importance than regime security.

In a region where a commitment to democracy and human rights has become a regional aspiration, democratisation will be a key element of security sector governance. In Myanmar, where the military regime in power is the main source of insecurity for citizens, SSR must be part of an extensive process of political reform and democratic transformation. South-East Asia illustrates how issues of effective security sector governance originate either from weak or absent democratic institutions. The main question, therefore, is how states within the region will address the need to align domestic political conditions with the commitments to democratisation made at the regional level.

Herman Joseph S Kraft
The Institute for Strategic and Development Studies
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Diliman, Quezon City
1101 Philippines
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