Mixed outcomes in southern Africa

South Africa is often regarded as a pioneer of security sector reform (SSR). Its SSR was comprehensive and involved the systematic reform of policing, defence and intelligence, while integrating seven different armed formations. There was no real disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), however, and the security forces achieved an appropriate size mostly through natural attrition. But SSR was largely indigenously driven and grounded in the political process – and it preceded the international debate on SSR.

For the southern African region as a whole, the picture is more complex. In the early 1980s, after gaining independence, Zimbabwe was the first country in the region to undergo what would today be called SSR.

Namibia also underwent SSR after independence in 1990. In both Zimbabwe and Namibia, SSR took place in the context of the DDR of former combatants and the integration of formerly adversarial armed formations. A British military advisory team played a prominent role in both countries and their ministries of defence were set up according to British models.

Partly as a result of mismanaged SSR, DDR and integration processes, the Zimbabwean military and police currently play a negative role in the country’s economic and political crisis. Both institutions are widely considered as instruments of repression deployed on behalf of President Mugabe and his party, ZANU-PF. The picture is not entirely bleak, however. Both services retain elements of professionalism and despite the disruptions of recent years have remained functional. A ‘second round’ of SSR (and DDR) will be needed if Zimbabwe’s unity government is to move towards free and fair elections.

In Namibia, the picture is brighter. A functional Ministry of Defence operates in the context of reasonably well-established civil-military relations and effective security governance, although there are some problems related to executive control and the lack of civil society or parliamentary engagement. Elsewhere in the region, SSR has been sporadic, superficial or incomplete, although it has been considered an essential element of democratic transitions. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), integration and DDR remain key challenges to peace, while a contested SSR process was partly to blame for the March 2009 coup in Madagascar.

Some of the lessons learnt and recommendations arising from the varied and complex southern African experience include:

• Successful SSR cannot be separated from DDR and security integration in post-conflict situations. The success of one element depends on the others, and SSR needs to be built into peace settlements. 
• Failure to carry out reforms during transition periods will leave a negative legacy for post-transition governments. 
• Indigenous knowledge and local ownership are important elements of success. While the South African experience is often held up as a positive example, it might not work in other situations. 
• Reform of policing and intelligence is as important as that of the armed forces, but the institutions do not all need to be reformed at the same time. 
• SSR needs to be grounded in political processes. 
• Considerable care needs to be taken to ensure that SSR does not destabilise political transitions to democracy.

Gavin Cawthra
Centre for Defence and Security Management
Graduate School of Public and Development Management
University of the Witwatersrand
PO Box 601
WITS 2050
South Africa
Gavin.Cawthra@wits.ac.za