Understanding international influences on security reform in Africa

Non-African nations have played a pivotal role in defining the relationship between security and development in Africa. There has been a huge growth in international efforts in security sector reform. But Africans are finding external influences can have unpleasant side effects.

Research from the Ethiopian Centre for Policy Research and Dialogue draws attention to external involvement in setting the security sector reform (SSR) agenda in Africa, particularly in post-conflict states. African policymakers and scholars need to understand the significance of recent geopolitical developments if they are to maximise the potential gains of external involvement in SSR.

The era since the end of the Cold War seemed to be defined, at least initially, by liberal, multilateral global governance. International commitment to engage with sources of insecurity and promote peace-related activities increased. In Africa, development agencies’ increased focus on security and governance led to an emphasis on the concept of SSR.

Donor interventions, however, have been characterised by a lack of coordination, understanding and long-term commitment, leading to uneven performance. African states often associate SSR with cuts in security expenditures, efforts to weaken national security forces, and external meddling in political matters. Nevertheless, the primary focus of donor policy efforts to date has been on defining the broad goals of SSR and policy prescriptions.

Traditionally, the main external actors in African SSR have been the European Union countries, particularly the UK. However, the international standing of SSR is now being threatened by new developments in global power relations:

• China is increasingly engaged in Africa, particularly in nations (including dictatorships) rich in energy resources, bringing both the promise of growth and threat of dependency; a major consideration is Beijing’s growing involvement in the security domain, particularly military assistance and peacekeeping. 
• The US-led ‘war on terror’ identifies Africa as a key area for counterterrorism operations, involving trade-offs with democratisation, conflict resolution, peace and security, and human rights. 
• The new US Africa Command (AFRICOM) will officially provide military aid and training for African states but is in reality more concerned with oil, China and terrorism. 
• NATO’s gradual involvement in Africa, starting with peacekeeping in Darfur, is limited and directionless so far but duplicates existing support provided to African institutions. 
• Private security actors have been operating in Africa, sometimes under the label of SSR, and are potentially dangerous, given the weakness of many African states.

Such developments could worsen an already difficult security environment. They could also divert attention from necessary reforms for sustainable peace and development. Key recommendations include:

• a forum for discussion between donors and the African Union (AU) in developing an SSR strategy, with the latter supporting their models with empirical research 
• collaboration among Southern researchers, policymakers and civil society organisations, including on private security groups and SSR monitoring mechanisms 
• a mechanism for African states to coordinate with the United Nations on SSR 
• significant local control and prioritisation of SSR programmes for a holistic and people-centred approach 
• integrated development and security assistance, based on comprehensive assessments, that helps national strategic reform efforts 
• agreements between AFRICOM and the AU rather than with individual African countries 
• African consensus on what is expected from China, particularly on its ever-increasing military assistance.

Medhane Tadesse
Center for Policy Research and Dialogue,
PO Box 24721/1000, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
T +251 1 614649
F +251 1 637674
cprd@ethionet.et 
www.cprdhorn.org