Document Abstract
Published:
2008
Colombia: making military progress pay off
Security in Colombia: dealing with the cost that military progress brings
This briefing paper analyses the progress made by President Álvaro Uribe’s administration in their security operations against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). It also takes into account, the role of external influences, most notably that of Venezuela and Ecuador.
The authors contend that six years of intense security operations against FARC by the President are beginning to produce tangible results. However, this progress has come at the cost of severely deteriorating relations with Ecuador and Venezuela and increased risk of political isolation after the controversial March 2008 attack on the FARC camp in Ecuador. Further to this, the authors argue that the Uribe administration should not put all its eggs in the military basket. It needs to promptly design and implement a complementary strategy that would allow it to gain political ground on the insurgents as well as recover broader international backing, especially regionally. Moving forward with the hostages-for-prisoners swap is crucial.
Any future strategy should therefore focus on:
The authors contend that six years of intense security operations against FARC by the President are beginning to produce tangible results. However, this progress has come at the cost of severely deteriorating relations with Ecuador and Venezuela and increased risk of political isolation after the controversial March 2008 attack on the FARC camp in Ecuador. Further to this, the authors argue that the Uribe administration should not put all its eggs in the military basket. It needs to promptly design and implement a complementary strategy that would allow it to gain political ground on the insurgents as well as recover broader international backing, especially regionally. Moving forward with the hostages-for-prisoners swap is crucial.
Any future strategy should therefore focus on:
- devising strongly conditioned political incentives to advance the hostages-for-prisoners swap with FARC
- engaging Ecuador immediately and Venezuela subsequently in order to reinforce border cooperation and prevent the use of sanctuaries
- redesigning the role of the group of friendly countries by giving it a limited mandate specifically for the hostages-for-prisoners swap and calling on Brazil to assume a leadership role
- expanding considerable investment in infrastructure for rural development so that economic alternatives to coca cultivation, better governance and rule of law can provide the basis for sustainable security in territory freed from FARC.
