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Combating corruption in the Asia-Pacific countries: what do we know and what needs to be done?

Identifying the most effective anti-corruption strategies in Asia-Pacific

Authors: J.S.T. Quah
Publisher: International Public Management Review, 2009

This paper reviews the literature on corruption to identify the major strategies adopted by the Asia-Pacific countries to combat corruption. The three patterns that emerge are:

  • pattern 1: anti-corruption laws without an independent anti-corruption agency (Mongolia and Papua New Guinea)
  • pattern 2: anti-corruption laws with multiple agencies (China, India and the Philippines)
  • pattern 3: anti-corruption laws with an independent agency (Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand, South Korea)
The paper finds that patterns 1 and 2 have failed to adequately deal with corruption in the countries studied:
  • the experiences of Mongolia and Papua New Guinea show that the existing agencies of the police, General Prosecutor’s Office and the courts in Mongolia, and the Ombudsman Commission and the police in Papua New Guinea are ineffective in curbing corruption
  • the reliance on multiple anti-corruption agencies in China, India, and the Philippines has not been effective in curbing corruption because of the lack of coordination, inter-agency competition, and the dilution of the anti-corruption effort by spreading the limited resources among these agencies
Regarding pattern 3, the experiences of Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand and South Korea show that this should only be adopted if there is political will. The political will of the governments in Hong Kong and Singapore in curbing corruption is clearly reflected in the higher per capita expenditure and more favourable staff-population ratios of the their anti-corruption agencies.

Conversely, the lack of political will of the governments in South Korea and Thailand is also reflected in the lower per capita expenditure and less favourable staff-population ratios of their agencies.

Pattern 3 has proved most effective because the independent anti-corruption agency is a specialised agency concerned solely with minimising corruption. Where the agency has other responsibilities like tackling terrorism and organised crime in addition to fighting corruption (India) its ability to fight corruption is weakened. An agency that cannot investigate corruption cases and has to rely on other agencies to do so (South Korea) and is subject to political interference will also be ineffective.

The paper concludes that an independent anti-corruption agency is not a magic bullet and the adoption of Pattern 3 will not automatically result in the eradication of corruption in a country if the political leaders are not committed to this task.