Electoral systems & reforms
Is all competition good? party systems and public good provision in Mexico’s provincial governments
Does decentralisation always produce welfare-enhancing results?
Authors:
E. L. Bacerra M
Publisher:
Duke University Library, 2007
The literature on decentralisation and democracy does not recognise that the decisions made by politicians at the local level may vary with contextual conditions. They may differ in important ways across levels of government and with serious consequences for social policy and poverty alleviation. This paper provides an initial look at this debate by analysing patterns of public resource allocation in Mexico’s provincial governments in the light of increased political competition.
The findings of this study supports the contention that:
- variation in government spending is not sufficiently explained by electoral competition itself. Thus, it is necessary to consider the structure of competition, when electoral pressures create incentives for politicians at the sub-national level to divert public resources for electoral purposes.
- decentralisation does not always produce welfare-enhancing results, but can instead provide resources for sub-national government's authoritarian or hegemonic parties to defend themselves from competition when specific institutional provisions are not present.
Under the assumption that the two Mexican political parties, PRI and PRD, practice clientelism, these results also point to an increase in patronage spending in the absence of programmatic parties.
