• Civil service reform

Civil service reform

There has been a proliferation of independent regulatory agencies (IRA) in pursuit of New Public Management ideas in public sector. The assumption behind this increasing trend of ‘agencification’ is that IRAs with formal autonomy will function in a more efficient, professional and neutral way than other bureaucratic organisations. This article, based on an examination of the autonomy of IRAs in Turkey, challenges this assumption.

Are IRAs in Turkey really so autonomous in practice and as their legal frameworks would suggest? With this overarching question, the paper first identifies the factors that led to the creation of the IRAs in Turkey and examines how was the framework for their de jure autonomy drawn up? It then examines the IRAs de facto autonomy in terms of the extent of independence they enjoy in their decision making.

The main findings are:

• although formal (de jure) autonomy is satisfactorily provided for by law, government tends to limit their autonomy through secondary legislation
• as regards de facto autonomy, boards are exposed to external and internal pressures and interferences in their deliberation
• the main source of pressure on board members is from regulated sectors themselves

Based on these findings the author concludes that

• de jure autonomy and de facto autonomy do not necessarily converge. De jure and autonomy has been satisfactorily laid down by law, but board members believe that institutional autonomy has been restricted in practice. The proposition linking managerial autonomy with professionalism and efficiency is thus questionable
• in terms of IRA autonomy the main concern hitherto has been focused on governmental interventions. However, the author points out, as IRAs are intervening in important conflicts of interest in the market, their independence from market forces is also crucial.
  

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