Who Runs Cities? Relating urban governance to poverty

Who really makes decisions in city governance? How are decisions made? Who influences decision makers? Does civil society participation in governance increase accountability and transparency? Does the concept of governance allow the interests of the poor to be addressed?

In an initial theme paper prepared by the University of Birmingham, for the Urban Governance, Partnerships and Poverty programme, the International Development Department has developed a theoretical framework for analysing urban governance. Recent trends of decentralisation and participation are increasingly focusing on local government and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) at the local level.

Decentralisation, whether driven by citizen demands, donor agency pressure or constraints on central government finance, is now a standard approach to urban service delivery and development issues. But behind the rhetoric, questions remain. Whose needs are really being represented? Does local government have the capacity and resources to tackle such tasks? Are city governments controlled by local elites? How can community participation in urban politics deal with the problem of conflicting interests? How can the interests of the poor be incorporated into urban management, if they are either unable or unwilling to participate?

The analytical framework aims to examine the decision-making processes of government officials, businesses, NGOs, CSOs, individuals and household members, connected in an intricate web of formal and informal relationships. The framework looks at decision-making processes and events, the rules that govern them and their outcomes, the people, parties and interests involved, and their relationships with each other, what gives individuals and groups power and influence, and what constrains that power and influence.

Issues identified include:

• Municipal government powers are constrained by central government, limited financial resources, abuse of office, and erosion of power by agencies such as development authorities.
• Mayors and elected councillors are constrained by lack of resources, lack of capacity to implement policies and conflict with officials.
• Mechanisms of accountability to citizens are weak and decision-making lacks transparency
• Development authorities and public utility companies often exercise monopoly power over essential services without any democratic accountability.
• Formal sector businesses can exercise influence through formal and informal lobbying.
• Private individuals and households exert influence through negotiation, voting, and membership of community organisations. Poorer citizens suffer greater exclusion through failure to register to vote, lack of time, skills or social contacts.
• NGOs, CSOs and CBOs can influence political events but this is determined by the extent of local support, financial resources and networking skills.

Hypotheses with implications for policy are therefore:

• What happens in cities is the product of a multitude of decisions, both formal and informal, by numerous actors and interests.
• No one person or group has complete control over urban decision making, let alone outcomes.
• Formal government power is not the same as effective power to deliver.
• The need to look beyond formal institutional structures to understand how decisions are made, who has power and influence, and how decisions relate to outcomes.
• Whilst different actors, groups and interests can exert influence through formal and informal processes, their ability to influence outcomes is highly unequal.
• The poor, whilst obviously disadvantaged in these processes, can influence them, through organising together, lobbying and using their voice in the democratic system.

Source(s):
'Who Runs Cities? The Relationship between Urban Governance, Service Delivery and Poverty', Urban Governance, Poverty and Partnerships Theme Paper 4, International Development Department, School of Public Policy, University of Birmingham by Nick Devas, March 1999

Funded by: UK Department for International Development (Escor)

id21 Research Highlight: 31 May 2001

Further Information:
Nick Devas
International Development Department
School of Public Policy
University of Birmingham
Birmingham
UK

Tel: +44 (0)121 414 5036
Fax: +44 (0)121 414 7995
Contact the contributor: c.n.devas@bham.ac.uk

International Development Department (IDD), University of Birmingham, UK

Other related links:
More from IDD's Urban Governance, Partnership and Poverty

'Urban links: a model city for the future?'

'Urban dynamics: better policies for city life'

Read more about IIED's work in Urban Areas

The World Bank focuses on Urban Development

This IDS programme examines the interplay between civil society and governments internationally