Putting together a shattered state: strengthening local administration in Afghanistan

The donor community, by focusing on technical reconstruction projects, has avoided addressing the political realities of post-Taliban Afghanistan. Outside Kabul, the state is very weak. Instead of legitimising and strengthening the elected government, such projects may be taken advantage of by local power holders.

The fall of the Taliban in November 2001 was followed by an agreement in Bonn that set out steps to establish a viable democratic state. In July 2002, a Loya Jirga (Constitutional Council) took place. This encouraged Afghans to believe that years of lawlessness would come to an end. However, the Bonn Agreement established a government that rested on a power base of warlords. They have since strengthened their military and economic positions, generating resources through smuggling, taxation and opium.

The short-sighted communications strategies of the government, donors and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have raised Afghani expectations of reconstruction assistance to unrealistic levels. Though reconstruction projects are critically important, they should not be the main strategy to strengthen the legitimacy and authority of the state. The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) provides analysis based on research that it jointly carried out with the World Bank. A wide range of local authorities, civil servants and representatives of NGOs in six provinces of Afghanistan, were interviewed.

Researchers found respondents virtually unanimous in their support for the restoration of central political authority and desire to be freed from the rule of warlords and local military commanders. In fact, many civil servants have continued to use administrative and fiscal mechanisms standardised before the war, demonstrating their commitment to a central state despite the lack of an ongoing relationship with Kabul.

The authors find that local representatives of the state find it difficult to carry out their duties because:

• They receive low salaries and payments are delayed, forcing them into dependence on regional power holders and often on the opium economy – estimated to have generated about half of Afghanistan’s Gross Domestic Product in 2003.
• At local level the Afghan state has very limited resources: government administrators can do little but mediate between local commanders and NGOs for assistance.
• Poorly paid and ill-equipped local police forces take orders from local commanders rather than government administrators.
• Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes have been half-hearted and have not involved many private militias, especially those supporting the US military in the ‘war on terror’.

The paradox is that the international community and the Afghan Government want to bring security through warlords who do not want security and have, indeed, been the greatest cause of insecurity.

AREU recommends:

• coordinated, long-term donor commitment to the development of provincial and district administrative structures staffed with trained, competent officials
• broad-based consultation to decide the roles and resources to be given to provincial and district councils: the government might consider postponing district elections
• establishing a legal framework to encourage accountable government and citizen participation in governance
• increased military presence of international troops outside the capital
• coordinated international policy on drug control, terrorism, regional stability and poverty reduction.

The Karzai government has begun to act more strongly against local autocrats but needs international support to carry out a coherent political strategy to weaken local power holders.

Source(s):
‘Strengthening subnational administration in Afghanistan: technical reform or state-building?’ by Sarah Lister and Andrew Wilder, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Public Administration and Development, 25, pp 39–48, 2005
‘Caught in confusion: local governance structures in Afghanistan’ by Sarah Lister, AREU Briefing Paper, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, March 2005 Full document.

Funded by: World Bank

id21 Research Highlight: 25 October 2005

Further Information:
Sarah Lister and Andrew Wilder
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)
PO Box 3169
Kabul
Afghanistan

Tel: +93 (0)70 276-637
Contact the contributor: sarah@areu.org.af

Contact the contributor: andrew@areu.org.af

Contact the contributor: areu@areu.org.af

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)

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