Learning from the ‘mountain tsunami’ – Kashmir’s earthquake

The earthquake that struck Pakistani Kashmir in October 2005 killed over 70,000 people, left 2.5 million homeless and had a devastating impact on the livelihoods of poor subsistence farmers. The national and international response, however, was not as generous or organised as that following the 2004 Asian tsunami.

A report from the University of York, UK explores the factors that create an environment vulnerable to the effects of disasters. The author argues that neither the conditions that give rise to disasters nor their impacts are natural. It is important to question the shortcomings of development to better understand the causes and impacts of disaster.

Pakistan was unprepared for the 2005 disaster, not having suffered a major earthquake since the 1930s. Its army lacked training and equipment but was, nevertheless, the only institution with the capacity to respond given the complete absence of civilian authorities designated to take control of disaster management. There was a high level of spontaneous voluntary search-and-rescue work and handouts, but no structures to coordinate their efforts and those of the Pakistani diaspora.

Survivors were victims of aid fatigue. Initial international pledges seemed generous, but were slow to arrive and never approached the levels of assistance provided after the December 2004 tsunami. The fact that no Western tourists were involved and the disaster did not happen just after Christmas allowed the tragedy to quickly slip from the front pages of newspapers. Deployment of Western helicopters – the only means of reaching remote mountainous areas after roads were washed away by post-earthquake landslides – was limited. Many victims were left to fend for themselves in severe winter conditions.

Matters were made worse because:

• Conflict-induced displacement had forced many to live in vulnerable locations around the Pakistani Kashmir capital of Muzaffarabad.
• Conflict over Kashmir weakened response capacity: in both Indian and Pakistani Kashmir mal-governance is widespread.
• Regulations for earthquake-resistant buildings were systematically ignored.
• Most disaster-affected people had to improvise their own shelters with whatever materials could be retrieved from destroyed houses.
• The disaster response did not recognise that farmers had lost an entire harvest, could not sow and had lost most of their livestock.

If reconstruction turns into a political struggle between the regime of President Musharraf and opposition parties and religious groups, it will be prolonged, ineffective and wasteful. The reconstruction process needs a shared vision among all involved, and this can only be achieved through consensus building and negotiations.

It is thus important to:

• develop a strategy to quickly move from relief to reconstruction to minimise the risk of long-term relief dependency
• turn the top-down approach of relief assistance into a bottom-up reconstruction process that allows for decentralised decision making and empowerment of affected communities
• avoid focusing only on physical rebuilding of houses, roads and hospitals: livelihoods and the local economy must be revitalised
• make sure that psychosocial needs are at the heart of reconstruction.

Source(s):
‘The Mountain Tsunami: Afterthoughts on the Kashmir Earthquake’, Third World Quarterly, Vol.27, No.3, by Alpaslan Özerdem, 2006

id21 Research Highlight: 9 March 2007

Further Information:
Alpaslan Özerdem
Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit
Department of Politics
University of York
Derwent College
York YO10 5DD, UK

Tel: +44 (0)1904 432643
Fax: +44 (0)1904 432641
Contact the contributor: ao102@york.ac.uk; alpozerdem@yahoo.com

University of York, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU)

Other related links:
'Stopping crises from becoming catastrophes'

'Counting the real cost. The long-term effects of natural disaster in Southeast Asia'

'Preparing for natural disasters makes economic sense'

'Reducing natural disaster risk to protect communities and their development'

ERM report for DFID: Natural disaster and disaster risk reduction measures (PDF)

Dealing with increased risk of natural disasters: challenges and options, IMF Working paper (PDF)