Making anti-corruption laws work in central and eastern Europe

International organisations such as the United Nations have targeted corruption with several conventions over the last decade. However, official validation of these conventions by governments has not been followed by effective action. Executive agencies in central and eastern Europe will only achieve this by overcoming difficulties in defining corruption and managing the costs of implementing anti-corruption legislation.

Corruption remains a serious problem in central and eastern Europe, despite the existence and validation of four influential anti-corruption treaties: the United Nations Convention against Corruption, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Convention on the Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions, and two Council of Europe treaties establishing civil and criminal liability in corruption cases. Research from Oxford University, in the UK, offers practical guidance to executive agencies seeking to fight corruption in the regions.

The main problem is that these international conventions have tended to increase penalties for corruption, and to increase resource and time demands upon governments, without making provision for the additional finances and skills required. They offer little guidance on the additional regulation that executive agencies, such as the tax police, customs and border guards, need to successfully implement anti-corruption legislation.

The author identifies the specific problems implementing agencies face:

• Government organisations and accomplices to corruption often escape from liability for corruption offences.
• The criminalisation of corruption may make prosecution harder because of the increased amount of proof that prosecutors need to present.
• Civil remedies (suing in courts for cash) may provide better methods of fighting corruption than trying to put offenders in jail.
• International conventions often provide little guidance about how to collect intelligence information, protect confidential information and other operative aspects of fighting corruption.

Anti-corruption results depend on the existence of incentives to tackle corruption; an incentive-based approach is superior to a regulations-based approach as the latter will tend to cause distortions in the public and private sector.

The author notes that anti-corruption work needs to be self-financing to be sustainable in developing countries. Also, concrete judicial tests need to identify corruption prior to prosecution and approaches to financing anti-corruption legislation:

• a contract-based test for corruption with two questions: whether extra payment was made for services the user has a right to, and if services were delivered expecting such a payment
• a two-question test establishing the criminal liability of parties to a corruption offense
• a two-question test establishing the direct or indirect involvement of an individual in a corrupt transaction, including superiors aware of offences committed by subordinates
• a test to determine the level of payments to those who denounce corrupt transactions

Finally, the paper provides advice on drafting articles for national legislation so international anti-corruption conventions can be implemented.

Source(s):
‘Drafting Implementing Regulations for International Anti-Corruption Conventions’, QEH Working Paper No.150, Oxford University: Oxford, by Bryane Michael, 2007 (PDF) Full document.

Funded by: European Union

id21 Research Highlight: 20 April 2008

Further Information:
Bryane Michael
Linacre College
Oxford OX1 2JA
UK

Tel: +44 1865 281800
Fax: +44 1865 281801
Contact the contributor: bryane.michael@linacre.ox.ac.uk

Linacre College, Oxford, UK

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