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Decentralisation: do poor people benefit from local government expenditure decisions?

Governments are increasingly focusing on decentralisation to reform and strengthen local government. This is often driven by demands from the public, national reconstruction programmes and, especially in Africa, donors. But is there evidence that this leads to pro-poor decisions that make better use of resources and reflect local needs?

A paper from the University of Birmingham in the UK examines decentralisation in Kenya and Uganda. The authors argue that representative democracy and periodic elections are crude ways to establish local needs and priorities. While both countries are beginning to provide greater opportunities for local participation, accountability of elected representatives and officials to local citizens still has a long way to go.

In 1997 Uganda’s Local Government Act transferred a wide range of responsibilities to local councils, together with greatly increased resources. Much of the funding for local councils is in the form of grants for basic services and infrastructure. As a result of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt-reduction initiative, substantial additional resources are now flowing to local councils.

Reform in Kenya has been less radical and the country still largely retains the British system it inherited at independence. However, efforts are being made to strengthen local government. In 1999 the Local Authorities Transfer Fund (LATF) was established to transfer five percent of national income tax to the country’s 174 local authorities (LAs).

The authors find that:

In Uganda, the increase in resources has allowed local governments to deliver and invest in services and infrastructure for the poor, and participatory decision making as well as upward accountability (local government to central government) has improved.
However, the local choice as to spending remains limited, participation is still difficult for marginal groups, and there are widespread concerns about corruption.
In Kenya, civil society and progressive local authorites have started working together, and LATF funding is enabling LAs to make real choices about service improvements and local infrastructure.
Most Kenyan LAs, however, have serious financial troubles because of poor revenue collection and over-optimistic revenue projections; when budgeted resources do not materialise and projects are not implemented, citizens lose confidence in the participatory process.
Most municipal decision making in Kenya does not involve the public, and most budgetary and expenditure information is not available to the public. Business interests have more influence than citizens.
Upward accountability in Kenya remains poor due to the limited ability of the Ministry of Local Government to monitor the activities of LAs or take effective action.

There is also growing recognition of the need for greater accountability of elected representatives and officials to citizens (downward accountability). For participation and accountability to work effectively, the authors suggest:

increased sharing of information about resource availability and service delivery
establishing procedures to allow auditors and inspectors to check information
central monitoring: upward accountability, through monitoring of performance (initiated by donors) and conditions for grants, has probably had a greater impact on improving local government performance in Uganda and Kenya than has accountability through the electoral system
committed and effective local leadership, particularly good working relationships between local officials and councillors
external pressure from civil society organisations and the media, especially local radio (as already happens in Uganda).

Decentralisation does not automatically lead to the inclusion of the poor. This will only happen if there are effective counterbalances to local elite interests, whether from central government, donors, the media or organisations representing poor people.

Source(s):
‘Local government decision-making – citizen participation and local accountability: some evidence from Kenya and Uganda’ by Nick Devas and Ursula Grant, Public Administration and Development, Volume 23, Issue 4, pp 307-316, October 2003

Funded by: Department for International Development, UK

id21 Research Highlight: 20 June 2005

Further Information:
Nick Devas and Ursula Grant
School of Public Policy
International Development Department
University of Birmingham
Birmingham B15 2TT
UK

Tel: +44 (0) 121 414 5038
Contact the contributor: c.n.devas@bham.ac.uk

University of Birmingham, UK

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