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Where state-building went wrong in Timor-Leste
In April 2006 an internal military dispute, fuelled by political elites, led to protest and gang violence on the streets of the Timor-Leste’s capital city, Dili. Security forces splintered. International peacekeepers returned.
Eventually Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri resigned. Half of the urban population ended up in camps for the internally displaced. Another 80,000 people fled Dili and returned to the countryside. Dreams of post-independence peace and prosperity for Timor-Leste - which had enjoyed strong national and international support since the end of Indonesian occupation in 1999 - were swiftly shattered.
Research from the Development Studies Institute at the London School of Economics, in the UK, asks why this state-building project in Timor-Leste failed. Previous attempts to answer this question either blame the governing party for authoritarianism and corruption or they blame foreign governments for interfering. This paper takes an alternative approach, considering state-building as a historical process of controlling violence and promoting economic growth and political legitimacy. It considers state-building in Timor-Leste in the context of the external global system. It also focuses on cities as the source of economic growth and as sites of ‘internal integration’ (linking economic, political and security processes across the national territory).
The author asks three central questions. How did Portugese rule and Indonesian occupation shape state-building in Timor-Leste? What agenda has the international community imposed since 1999? What are the consequences of this? He finds the model of state-building imposed by donors to have been profoundly flawed, leading to the disintegration of the country. Specifically:
- Donor funding enforced policies of small government, conservative economics and private sector growth strategies.
- A commitment to lean government created an administration unable to effectively serve its rural constituents.
- The removal of state marketing infrastructure in agriculture and a deregulated economy stimulated a retreat into subsistence farming, which led to runaway urbanisation in Dili.
- Dili turned into a precarious city-state, politically, economically and psychologically isolated from the rest of the country.
- Stagnant employment markets, a housing squeeze, unaffordable basic commodities and widespread discontent prevailed in Dili, leading eventually to gang violence.
The research suggests that if state-building in Timor-Leste had attempted to integrate economic, political and security processes across the urban-rural divide, it would have had more chance of success. Specific recommendations include:
- State-coordinated labour-intensive projects to build rural infrastructure (which would improve agricultural marketing, inject cash into the rural economy and restore faith in the state).
- Support for under-funded initiatives for enhancing local food security and productivity (to fill stomachs and engage the rural population).
- A wider process of empowering Timorese social groups and movements and engaging them with the state.
The author concludes that there is hope for Timor-Leste. The country needs to pursue a path between the extremes of donor-led state-building and an emphasis on economic growth and security to the expense of all else. A focus on internal integration – viewed as an engagement between state and citizen – could take the conflict out of the post-conflict nation.
Source(s):
‘State-Making and the Post-Conflict City: Integration in Dili,
Disintegration in Timor-Leste’, London School of Economics Crisis States
Research Centre Working Paper Series No 2, Working Paper 21, by Ben Moxham,
February 2008 (PDF) Full document.
Further details about this research project on the Research for
Development Portal Full document.
Funded by: UK Department of International Development
id21 Research Highlight: 29 April 2009
Further Information:
Ben Moxham
Contact the contributor: benmoxham@hotmail.com
Crisis States Research Centre
Room U610, London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE, UK
Tel:
+44 20 7849 4631
Fax:
+44 20 7955 6421
Contact the contributor: csp@lse.ac.uk
