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Negotiating between traditional authority and democracy in South Africa

Following the end of apartheid, South Africa made a relatively peaceful transition to a non-racial democracy. However, the African National Congress government has had to make significant concessions to traditional authority, particularly in KwaZulu-Natal. In the city of Durban, traditional chiefs share power with elected councillors in a unique, if difficult system of governance.

Two papers explore the relationship between traditional authorities and democratic local government in the major city of Durban in KwaZulu-Natal. The author also considers A.O. Hirschmann’s thesis that people react to a deterioration in services provided by organisations by either switching sides, protesting, or staying loyal (‘exit, voice or loyalty’).

South Africa’s democratic transition in 1994 was hailed as a success, despite the rivalry between the liberal African National Congress (ANC) government and the traditionally inclined Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). In IFP stronghold KwaZulu-Natal, the ANC is negotiating the role of traditional authorities in a liberal democracy. This has come at a time when people are looking to traditional systems across Africa for their perceived stability.

In 2000, fifteen traditional authority areas on the borders of the Durban were incorporated into Greater Durban. To maintain political control over the city, the ruling ANC included traditional authorities in local governance structures, a practical measure that also allowed for cheap decentralised development. The interactions between the chiefs and elected councillors have ranged from good to hostile.

Key findings from interviews of residents in the newly incorporated areas include:

Support for traditional authority is based on the belief of people that chiefs represent them and deliver material services. As yet, metropolitan government has little to offer residents on the borders of the city, and what it has provided is often not attributed to it. However, the overwhelming majority of respondents believed that traditional chiefs and local government should cooperate to bring development. The author recommends that:

Metropolitan authorities should recognise and accommodate the institution of chiefdom in a way that undermines neither the stability it provides nor the democratic rights of the people.

Source(s):
‘Cultural weapons: Traditions, Inventions and the Transition to Democratic Governance in Metropolitan Durban’, Urban Studies, Vol.43, No.2, pages 457-472, by Jo Beall, 2006
‘Exit, Voice and Tradition: Loyalty to Chieftainship and Democracy in Metropolitan Durban, South Africa’, Working Paper No.59, Crisis States Research Centre, LSE: London, by Jo Beall, 2005 (PDF) Full document.

id21 Research Highlight: 30 March 2007

Further Information:
Jo Beall
Development Studies Institute
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE, UK

Tel: +44 (0) 20 7955 7425
Fax: +44 (0) 20 7955 7563
Contact the contributor: J.Beall@lse.ac.uk

London School of Economics

Other related links:
'Agenda 21 in South Africa: foreign, green and anti-development?'

'Understanding corruption in West Bengal: is decentralisation the answer?'

'Kick starting South African township residential property markets'

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