Patronage, politics and toilets

Donors have persuaded many policy-makers in developing countries that the main problem with direct public service provision is the lack of incentives for public servants. They have subsequently sought to involve communities, citizens and the private sector in the management of urban sanitation services instead. Ideas about the benefits of such participatory and market approaches may, however, be overly-optimistic.

A paperfrom the University of Ghana and the Institute of DevelopmentStudies examines the impact of new forms of partnership between publicauthorities and private/citizen-based organisations in poor neighbourhoods of Accra and Kumasi. Tracing the history of two decades of failed public toilet policies, they warnthat improvements in service provision cannot materialise if contractors arenot accountable and the state is unable to regulate performance standards.

In Ghana, aselsewhere, donors and local authorities are committed to phasing out publictoilets in favour of household-based facilities. However, funding has only beensecured for tiny pilot projects. Local government continues to depend onrevenue from public toilets – Sub-Metropolitan District Councils derive twothirds of their income from them.

Ghana has triedvarious forms of toilet management, ranging from the Committees for the Defenceof the Revolution (established by the populist former President Rawlings’government in the 1980s), to franchising, to community businesses and direct managementby sub-metropolitan districts. The number of toilets has increased while fundsavailable for their cleaning and maintenance have declined.

Public toilets represent an appalling health risk:

• In Kumasi 90percent of human waste remains in the city because of failure to empty latrinesand septic tanks and dumping of waste.
• Waste which is transported to landfills is nottreated and leaches into rivers and streams.
• Vector-borne diseases such as malaria and bilharziaare widespread, due to lack of pest and vector control and hygiene educationprogrammes.
• Large numbers of people in urban neighbourhoodscontinue to defecate in public.
• Both constructed and natural drainage systems havebecome choked with a mixture of human and solid wastes – blockages are worsenedby a massive increase in the use of plastic bags.

Management and control of public toilets have becomea source of political patronage with which local and sometimes nationalpoliticians reward their clients. Although contracts were supposed to be givento registered local companies with demonstrated capacity, in practice the mostfrequent beneficiaries have been elected local government representatives usingfront companies disguised as “community businesses”. Public toilets arepolitically protected business opportunities given out as political favours.

Decentralisation has been accompanied by reductionsin capacity and finances. These have reinforced the appeal of franchising orcontracting-out to relieve the local government authorities of the burden oflooking after toilets while offering the prospect of an improved revenuestream.

Regulation is weak. When environmental healthofficers take action they are mocked by magistrates and contractors. The powerof officials has declined, while the power of politicians and contractors hasincreased.

If urban Ghanaians are ever to be provided with reasonable sanitation facilities:

• Infrastructure for public goods-type services such as sewerage,sanitation, drainage and solid waste collection will probably need to bepublicly provided.
• Contractsfor service provision given to non-state agencies must be independently andtransparently regulated.
• Conflict-of-interestlaws should be rigorously applied to elected local representatives.

Some ofthe community-based organisations encouraged to enter the sanitation sector maynot be the accountable development agents they claim to be. Ghana’s experience hasshown the need for improved analysis of the political context within whichpublic-private partnerships operate and better understanding of the politicalpressures which shape the choice of partners and performance monitoring.