Learning from the ‘mountain tsunami’ – Kashmir’s earthquake

The earthquake that struck Pakistani Kashmir in October 2005 killed over 70,000 people, left 2.5 million homeless and had a devastating impact on the livelihoods of poor subsistence farmers. The national and international response, however, was not as generous or organised as that following the 2004 Asian tsunami.

A report from the University of York, UK explores the factors that create an environment vulnerable to the effectsof disasters. The author argues that neither the conditions that give rise todisasters nor their impacts are natural. It is important to question theshortcomings of development to better understand the causes and impacts ofdisaster.

Pakistan was unprepared for the 2005 disaster, not having suffered a majorearthquake since the 1930s. Its army lacked training and equipment but was,nevertheless, the only institution with the capacity to respond given thecomplete absence of civilian authorities designated to take control of disastermanagement. There was a high level of spontaneous voluntary search-and-rescuework and handouts, but no structures to coordinate their efforts and those ofthe Pakistani diaspora.

Survivors were victims of aid fatigue. Initialinternational pledges seemed generous, but were slow to arrive and neverapproached the levels of assistance provided after the December 2004 tsunami.The fact that no Western tourists were involved and the disaster did not happenjust after Christmas allowed the tragedy to quickly slip from the front pagesof newspapers. Deployment of Western helicopters – the only means of reachingremote mountainous areas after roads were washed away by post-earthquakelandslides – was limited. Many victims were left to fend for themselves insevere winter conditions.

Matters were made worse because:

• Conflict-induceddisplacement had forced many to live in vulnerable locations around thePakistani Kashmir capital of Muzaffarabad.
• Conflict over Kashmir weakened response capacity:in both Indian and Pakistani Kashmir mal-governance is widespread.
• Regulations forearthquake-resistant buildings were systematically ignored.
• Most disaster-affectedpeople had to improvise their own shelters with whatever materials could beretrieved from destroyed houses.
• The disaster response didnot recognise that farmers had lost an entireharvest, could not sow and had lost most of their livestock.

If reconstruction turns into a politicalstruggle between the regime of President Musharrafand opposition parties and religious groups, it will be prolonged, ineffectiveand wasteful. The reconstruction process needs a shared vision among allinvolved, and this can only be achieved through consensus building andnegotiations.

It is thus important to:

• develop a strategy toquickly move from relief to reconstruction to minimisethe risk of long-term relief dependency
• turn the top-down approachof relief assistance into a bottom-up reconstruction process that allows for decentralised decision making and empowerment of affectedcommunities
• avoid focusing only onphysical rebuilding of houses, roads and hospitals: livelihoods and the localeconomy must be revitalised
• make sure that psychosocial needs are at the heart of reconstruction.