Payments for environmental services: lessons from CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe

There is increasing support for using payments for environmental services (PES) to lessen poverty and promote conservation. The Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) shares many features with PES schemes. What can these schemes learn from CAMPFIRE?

PES schemes rewardpeople, either with cash or in-kind benefits, to manage their land in ways thatwill secure environmental services. These services include maintainingbiodiversity, storing carbon and protecting watersheds. They differ from moreconventional integrated conservation and development approaches by makingpayments directly and conditional on the level of environmental service achieved.PES schemes are therefore generally more cost-effective and have less complex institutionalarrangements than other approaches.

A study by tworesearchers from the Center for International Forestry Research in Indonesiaand the International Institute for Environment and Development in the UKreviewed the evolution of CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe over its first 12 years, to seewhat lessons there might be for PES.

Under CAMPFIRE, RuralDistrict Councils (RDCs) are granted the authority tomarket wildlife on behalf of the people living in their area. Concessions tohunt or photograph wildlife are sold to safari operators who, in turn, marketthese to mainly foreign sport hunters or eco-tourists. The RDC passes on tocommunities 50 percent of the revenues and other benefits received from thesale of concessions. It keeps the balance to fund wildlife management and itsown activities. As RDCs have become short of cash,delays in payment and occasional underpayments have become more frequent.

Between 1989 and 2001,CAMPFIRE generated over US$ 20 million for the participating communities, 89percent of it coming from sport hunting. Although 37 districts have the authorityto market wildlife, only 12 regularly generate revenue this way. Performancevaries with wildlife resources, human population density, local institutionalarrangements, and governance.

CAMPFIRE provides someuseful lessons for emerging PES schemes.

• Organisational structures andinstitutional arrangements should develop alongside the functions that theyare designed to serve, not be fixed ahead of them.
• PES schemes should remain flexibleto accommodate inevitable changes in objectives and functions.
• Allow for diversity: communitiesvary in environmental and social settings, as well as in the level and natureof external support.
• Recognise institutional complexityand work within it; for example, by building on traditionaldecision-making rather than displacing it.
• Do not be distracted by thecomplexity of measuring direct causal connections between payments, land usechange and indicators of ecological functioning.
• High uncertainty increasestransaction costs. Exhaustive monitoring of the links between payments, landuse changes and management may become counter-productive by raising costsmore than benefits.

Three issues remainunresolved.

• The optimal scale of decision-makingand management (small) is at odds with the size of viable wildlifeproduction areas (large).
• Overlapping jurisdictions amongdifferent authorities and interest groups complicates the organisation ofsuch schemes.
• The lack of clearly defined propertyrights and strong tenure among individuals and communities weakensresponsibility and concern for resources in the long-term.