What lessons can be learned from the Starter Packs Programme in Malawi?

What lessons can be learned from the Starter Packs Programme in Malawi?

What lessons can be learned from the Starter Packs Programme in Malawi?

In the late 1990s, the Malawian government tried to tackle extensive, chronic food insecurity by increasing agricultural productivity. The Starter Packs Programme was an initiative that provided free packs of seeds, legumes and fertiliser to farmers. What lessons can be learned from this programme, and its subsequent demise?

Researchfrom the University of London, in the UK, analyses the Starter Pack Programme(SPP). The stated aim of the SPP was to boost agricultural production bysupplying improved agricultural technologies to farmers. It was also expectedthat the number of months that households were able to feed themselves wouldincrease, thereby strengthening food security.

Everysmallholder household (nearly 85 percent of Malawi’s population) received freepacks of improved seed, fertiliser and legumes. Distributing food crop seedsand fertilisers had been tried before, but the SPP aimed for universalcoverage, distributing 2.8 million packs. The SPP made a clear contribution toincreased food availability and access to food. Theinclusion of legumes in the pack contributed to increasing soil fertility anddiversified sources of food.

Beforethe SPP, donors disagreed among themselves and with the Malawian governmentover the best way to reduce food insecurity. These disagreements concerned foodpricing, cash crop production, agricultural inputs and food aid. The SPP wasthe government's response to this policy confusion.

TheSPP approach aimed to build household self-sufficiency and strengthen the domesticcapacity to produce food, rather than using resources to buy imported food. Butthis approach went against the views of many donors on food security policy,and many opposed the programme.

  • The European Commissionhad just changed its food security policy to livelihood diversification; it sawthe SPP as inhibiting livelihood diversification by focusing on promoting maizeproduction.
  • USAID saw theSPP as undermining the development of agricultural inputs from the privatesector.
  • The SPP wasfrequently criticised for the late delivery of the packs and poor extensionadvice; the government argued that this was partly due to the lack of financialcommitment from donors.
  • The SPP was alsocriticised for being expensive, but this criticism did not usually compare thecost of alternative policies, which would have cost at least as much but notnecessarily benefited as many people.

Asa result of this opposition, the SPP was scaled down and now no longer operatesat all. There is still a range of contrasting opinions about the best long termapproaches to food security, including opinions of merits of using a SPP in acountry. The researcher concludes:

  • If properlyimplemented, a universal SPP can improve food security at all levels in acountry, but it cannot provide economic growth.
  • A universal SPPcan alleviate one key symptom of poverty – food insecurity –but it does not havea direct, lasting impact on poverty reduction.
  • To besuccessful, a universal SPP needs to be part of a larger national food securitystrategy.