Defining India’s security: looking beyond limited war and cold start strategies

The reciprocal India-Pakistan nuclear tests had occurred earlier in May 1998, and a state of nuclear deterrence was established thereafter between the two countries. This essay argues that the potential of the security situations spinning out of control and breaching the nuclear threshold was very real.

The paper points that “Limited War and Cold War” doctrines were developed against this general backdrop of the inability of the armed forces on to exploit India’s superior conventional forces against Pakistan due to its nuclear deterrent.

However, the Cold Start strategy demands a very carefully modulated offensive strategy being pursued to keep Pakistan off-balance. In fact, the overall aim of a ‘limited’ war” would be the destruction of the Pakistan Army’s war waging potential and capture of some territory to compel Pakistan to desist from supporting the anti-India terrorist groups.

In addition, there are several problems that arise in operationalising the Limited War and Cold Start strategy. For example, how could it be ensured that a limited conflict will stay limited?

Conclusions comprise:

• India’s strategic doctrine must avoid a repetition of the border confrontation crisis experience
• a greater interaction with the USA is urgently required to deal with the universal threat posed by non-state actors, who threaten regional stability
• Pakistan needs to be plainly recognised as the epi-centre of the global threat from terrorism proliferation, underpinned by religious fundamentalism
• India’s security challenges need a more sophisticated response than simplistic solutions - a task for the Indian armed forces, diplomatic community and strategic elite