Local Collective Action and Armed Conflict in Colombia
15th July 2014
In this article, Professor Ana María Ibáñez, from the University of Los Andes in Colombia, describes how the country's 50-year conflict has shaped local institutions, social preferences and the capacity of people to act collectively. This piece is based on collaborative research undertaken with colleague Margarita Gáfaro, and Patricia Justino from the Institute of Devleopment Studies (IDS), UK.
Colombia has endured an armed conflict for half a century. However, in August 2012 the National Government and the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) initiated a peace negotiation process, and after two years have reached agreement on three key areas: access to land and rural development; the political participation of guerrilla members; and the illicit drug trade.
The progress of the peace process raises hopes that the conflict might be finally near to an end. Yet new challenges will emerge during the post-conflict phase and the country needs to be prepared. One important aspect is how the 50-year conflict shaped local institutions, social preferences and the capacity of people to act collectively. Collective action is crucial for shaping economic development and tackling poverty but can conflict weaken the ability of communities to organize collectively and have a voice?
Previous evidence has suggested that direct exposure to violence increases pro-social behavior and community engagement in collective action. Our research looked at whether armed conflict modified the decisions of households to participate in local organizations. We also found that the presence of armed groups has a significant impact on the ability of communities to organize themselves and act collectively. Furthermore, in communities where the armed groups stayed longer, people participate more overall, assume leadership roles with a higher frequency and attend more meetings. The effect is driven mostly by political organizations. However, larger participation does not necessarily translate into more democratic decisions. For instance one additional year of armed group presence increases participation in political organizations by 5.6% and attendance to meetings by 5%, whilst reducing decision making by 3%.
We also explore whether increased participation is driven by communities organizing themselves to resist non-state armed actors or by non-state armed actors capturing organizations to impose a strong control over the population. Our results indicate the negative explanation dominates: non-state armed actors capture local organizations. Furthermore, wealthier and better educated citizens participate more in regions with armed group presence, suggesting armed groups form alliances with particular groups of the population. Locals are excluded from political organizations, which may indicate armed groups impose leaders and members that support their political cause. In addition, the impact on participation is stronger when armed groups have been longer in the community as this provides them time to consolidate their control.
A post-conflict process needs to recognize the complex dynamics the conflict unleashed. After demobilization, we can expect that FARC will activate all these networks of organizations and leaders they created during the 50 years of conflict to control local institutions and gain political leverage. Yet these organizations and new political parties may not necessarily represent the interests and needs of the local population, who had been dominated for decades by fear, intimidation and threats. The national government needs to invest and create strong institutions to ensure the interests of the community are represented in the political arena. This is not an easy task. Colombia has demonstrated amply its inability to have a strong institutional presence in rural areas.
Colombia has endured an armed conflict for half a century. However, in August 2012 the National Government and the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) initiated a peace negotiation process, and after two years have reached agreement on three key areas: access to land and rural development; the political participation of guerrilla members; and the illicit drug trade.
The progress of the peace process raises hopes that the conflict might be finally near to an end. Yet new challenges will emerge during the post-conflict phase and the country needs to be prepared. One important aspect is how the 50-year conflict shaped local institutions, social preferences and the capacity of people to act collectively. Collective action is crucial for shaping economic development and tackling poverty but can conflict weaken the ability of communities to organize collectively and have a voice?
Previous evidence has suggested that direct exposure to violence increases pro-social behavior and community engagement in collective action. Our research looked at whether armed conflict modified the decisions of households to participate in local organizations. We also found that the presence of armed groups has a significant impact on the ability of communities to organize themselves and act collectively. Furthermore, in communities where the armed groups stayed longer, people participate more overall, assume leadership roles with a higher frequency and attend more meetings. The effect is driven mostly by political organizations. However, larger participation does not necessarily translate into more democratic decisions. For instance one additional year of armed group presence increases participation in political organizations by 5.6% and attendance to meetings by 5%, whilst reducing decision making by 3%.
We also explore whether increased participation is driven by communities organizing themselves to resist non-state armed actors or by non-state armed actors capturing organizations to impose a strong control over the population. Our results indicate the negative explanation dominates: non-state armed actors capture local organizations. Furthermore, wealthier and better educated citizens participate more in regions with armed group presence, suggesting armed groups form alliances with particular groups of the population. Locals are excluded from political organizations, which may indicate armed groups impose leaders and members that support their political cause. In addition, the impact on participation is stronger when armed groups have been longer in the community as this provides them time to consolidate their control.
A post-conflict process needs to recognize the complex dynamics the conflict unleashed. After demobilization, we can expect that FARC will activate all these networks of organizations and leaders they created during the 50 years of conflict to control local institutions and gain political leverage. Yet these organizations and new political parties may not necessarily represent the interests and needs of the local population, who had been dominated for decades by fear, intimidation and threats. The national government needs to invest and create strong institutions to ensure the interests of the community are represented in the political arena. This is not an easy task. Colombia has demonstrated amply its inability to have a strong institutional presence in rural areas.