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Searching with a thematic focus on Drivers of conflict, Conflict and security, Governance
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Counter terror operations: limitations to security forces
Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, India, 2002Although the use of force has been considered to be one of the many tools of counter-terror operations, it appears to be the only exercised choice in India. Given this over-reliance, the paper claims that there exists little difference between counterinsurgency and counter-terror operations from the point of use of military force.DocumentClassification of natural resources for armed civil conflict research
Norwegian University of Science and Technology, 2003This paper focuses on recent research that identifies natural resource abundance as a factor that significantly increases the risk of conflict.DocumentJammu and Kashmir dispute: examining various proposals for its resolution
Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan, 2002India and Pakistan have fought four open wars, all stemming from the central issue over the control of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Given the fact that the security paradigm has been completely changed with the unveiling of nuclear arsenals on both sides of the border, this five-decade long conflict has disastrous possibilities if ignored.DocumentSouth Asia: counter-terrorism policies and postures after 9/11
Institute for Conflict Management, India, 2004India has been engaged in counter-terrorism efforts since the 1980s, having diverted massive amounts of financial and military resources towards addressing low-intensity conflicts that characterise terrorist activities. There has, however, been no coordinated policy-level effort to address the issue of counter-terrorism, and most of India’s reactions to events has been ad-hoc.DocumentUnderstanding Nepal Maoists' demands: revisiting events of 1990
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, India, 2003The Maoist insurgency which began in February 1996 is the major security challenge facing Nepal, having affected almost all the 75 districts of the country. The Maoists' core demands-an interim government, an elected Constituent Assembly to frame a new Constitution, a republican state-revolve around issues which seemed to have been settled in the 1990 Constitution.DocumentRise of religious parties in Pakistan: causes and prospects
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, India, 2003In the October 2002 general elections, religious parties and two Provincial Assemblie (those of North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan) made inroads into the National Assembly. A conglomeration of six parties, the Muttahida Majilis-e-Amal (MMA) emerged as a new political force and a political alternative to the PPP and PML-Nawaz (PML-N).DocumentBangladesh: Extremist Islamist Consolidation
Institute for Conflict Management, India, 2003The 2001 general elections in Bangladesh have revealed the depth and sophistication of organisation of extremist Islamist organisations. Prominent and senior members of fundamentalist organisations are now members of the ruling coalition, signalling the possible beginning of a new era of non-secular government in Bangladesh.DocumentPoor performers in Sub-Saharan Africa: exclusion or integration?
Institute for Security Studies, 2004Political events since 9/11 have brought renewed focus onto ‘poor performing’ countries, owing to the real or perceived threat that some of these countries are directly responsible for supporting/harbouring/arming terrorist networks.DocumentBroken vows: exposing the loupe holes in the diamond industry’s efforts to prevent the trade in conflict diamonds
Global Witness, 2004This paper evaluates how well the US diamond industry is complying with self-regulation established to eliminate the trade in conflict diamonds, known as the ‘Kimberley Process’.The paper finds compliance with the Kimberley Process among companies surveyed ‘abysmal’:only five of the thirty retailers sent information on their policies on conflict diamonds when requestedthere were low
