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Trade and the accumulation and diffusion of knowledge
Policy Research Working Papers, World Bank, 1996The accumulation of knowledge affects trade performance and competitiveness, but trade also (through imports) affects the accumulation of knowledge.Padoan examines the properties of a dynamic disequilibrium model focused on trade specialization and the accumulation of knowledge.DocumentInternational capital flows : do short - term investment and direct investment differ?
Policy Research Working Papers, World Bank, 1996Empirical support for the conventional notion that short-term investment is "hot money" and direct investment is not: short-term investment appears to respond more dramatically to disturbances in other capital flows and in other countries than does direct investment.Chuhan, Perez-Quiros, and Popper examine the behavior of four major components of international capital flows in 15 developing andDocumentFrom learning to partnership : multinational R&D cooperation in developing countries
Policy Research Working Papers, World Bank, 1996Do multinationals cooperate in research and development with local firms in developing countries?DocumentThe Polish experience with bank and enterprise restructuring
Policy Research Working Papers, World Bank, 1997Poland's program tackled simultaneously bank and enterprise restructuring and dealt decisively with the bad debt stock and flow problem with measures to improve incentives and institutional skills. Among transition economies, Poland was a pioneer in bank and enterprise restructuring.DocumentSouth - North migration and trade : a survey
Policy Research Working Papers, World Bank, 1996Can trade liberalization be used to deter South North immigration? Is trade a substitute for migration? Not necessarily. Assuming that migration generates externalities, the South should liberalize trade, while the North should impose an (optimal) immigration tax.DocumentRegulating market risk in banks : a comparison of alternative regulatory regimes
Policy Research Working Papers, World Bank, 1996Market risk is an increasingly important issue for banks and so for bank regulation. Stephanou compares three approaches to setting risk based capital adequacy standards: the building bloc approach, the internal models approach, and the precommitment approach. Regulators have traditionally used simple models to measure banks' capital adequacy.DocumentHow Foreign Investment Affects Host Countries
Policy Research Working Papers, World Bank, 1999Foreign direct investment may promote economic development by helping to improve productivity growth and exports in the multinationals' host countries.DocumentMoving to Greener Pastures? Multinationals and the Pollutionhaven Hypothesis
Policy Research Working Papers, World Bank, 1999Eskeland and Harrison find almost no evidence that investors in developing countries are fleeing environmental costs at home. Instead, the evidence suggests that foreign owned plants in four developing countries are less polluting than comparable domestic plants.Are multinationals flocking to "pollution havens" in developing countries?DocumentPrivatization, public investment, and capital income taxation
Policy Research Working Papers, World Bank, 1997Huizinga and Nielsen investigate the optimal boundary between the public and private production sectors. They use a model in which government and private production coexist in which a range of production activities can be carried out by either the government or the private sector.In effect, the government determines which activities to maintain within the public sector and which to privatize.DocumentSafe and sound banking in developing countries : we're not in Kansas anymore
Policy Research Working Papers, World Bank, 1997Making banking safe and sound in developing countries requires (1) paying more attention to factors that restrict banks' ability and willingness to diversify risk and (2) giving three key groups owners (and managers), the market, and supervisors more incentive and ability to monitor banks and ensure their prudent corporate governance.Drawing on earlier work, Caprio reviews some of the salientPages
